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We introduce a simple extension of the minority game in which the market rewards contrarian
(resp. trend-following) strategies when it is far from (resp. close to) efficiency. The model displays a
smooth crossover from a regime where contrarians dominate to one where trend-followers dominate.
In the intermediate phase, the stationary state is characterized by non-Gaussian features as well as
by the formation of sustained trends and bubbles.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.20.-y, 05.70.Fh
Financial markets are known to generate non-trivial
fluctuation phenomena [1, 2] that are qualitatively re-
produced by several models where agents with prescribed
trading rules interact through a complex mechanism of
price formation [3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Originally devised to get a
more fundamental grasp on the critical behavior of sys-
tems of heterogeneous agents, the minority game [8] was
able to capture some of the complex macroscopic phe-
nomenology of markets starting from primitive micro-
scopic ingredients [9, 10, 11], clarifying the roles of dif-
ferent factors contributing to the complexity of market
dynamics. Still, many important issues escape a more
basic investigation.
One of these is the interaction of different types of
agents. Broadly speaking, traders can be divided in
two groups, namely contrarians (or fundamentalists) and
trend-followers (or chartists). The former believe that
the market is close to a stationary state and buy (sell)
when they repute the stock to be underpriced (over-
priced), thus inducing anti-correlation in market returns
and holding the price close to its ‘fundamental’ value.
The latter, instead, extrapolate trends from recent price
increments and buy or sell assuming that the next incre-
ment will occur in the direction of the trend, thus creating
positive return correlations and large price drifts (‘bub-
bles’). Chartist behavior, which can also be driven by im-
itation, is known to cause market instability [6, 12]. Fun-
damentalists act instead as a restoring force that dumps
market inefficiencies and excess volatility. It has been
argued [12, 13] that contrarians (trend followers) are de-
scribed by minority (majority) game players (but see also
[14, 15]), and the analysis of mixed majority-minority
games has shown that the presence of trend followers
can severely alter the market’s efficiency [16]. However,
agents in these models are committed to either one of the
types, and switching from one group to the other, a key
feature in other models [6], is not allowed.
Here we introduce a class of market games that by-
passes this limitation. We assume that trend-following
behavior dominates when price movements are small, as
agents try to anticipate trends, whereas traders turn to
a contrarian conduct when the market becomes chaotic.
This mechanism causes a ‘feedback’ in the dynamics of
the excess demand: when it is small, trend-followers dom-
inate and drive it to larger values; but once it has be-
come sufficiently large, contrarians take over and drive
it back to smaller values by inducing anti-correlations.
In this way, it is the market that determines whether
trend-following or contrarian strategies gain and there is
no need to employ different payoff functions. We will use
the cutoff between the majority- (where trend-followers
win) and the minority-regime (where contrarians win) as
a control parameter to discriminate fundamentalists- and
chartists-dominated phases. The most remarkable phe-
nomenology occurs, not surprisingly, in-between the two.
Hereafter, we shall use the prefixes <- and >- for ‘mi-
nority’ and ‘majority’, respectively.
Our basic setup is as follows. At each time step t,
N agents receive an information µ(t) chosen at random
from {1, . . . , P} with uniform probability. Based on µ(t),
agents have to formulate a binary bid bi(t) (‘buy/sell’).
To this aim, each of them is endowed with S strate-
gies aig = {aµig} (g = 1, . . . , S) that map informations
µ ∈ {1, . . . , P} into actions aµig ∈ {−1, 1}. Each compo-
nent aµig of every strategy is selected randomly and inde-
pendently from {−1, 1} with equal probability for every
i, g and µ at the beginning of the game and fixed, so that
strategies play the role of a quenched disorder. Finally,
each strategy of every agent is given an initial valuation
pig(0) that is updated at the end of every round.
At each time step, every agent picks the strategy
g˜i(t) = argmaxg pi,g(t) with the largest valuation and
formulates the bid bi(t) = a
µ(t)
ig˜i(t)
. The (normalized) ex-
cess demand at time t, namely the mismatch between
the total demand and the total supply, is defined as
A(t) = N−1/2
∑N
i=1 bi(t), and strategy valuations are up-
dated according to
pig(t+ 1) = pig(t) + a
µ(t)
ig F [A(t)] (1)
where F is a function embodying the rules with which
payoffs are assigned or the way agent i assesses the per-
formance of his/her gth strategy (in which case one could
also assume that F depends on i). In the <-game,
F (A) = −A, so at each time step strategies suggest-
ing the minority action are rewarded. In the >-game,
instead, F (A) = A. Here we set
F (A) = A− ǫA3 (2)
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FIG. 1: Volatility σ2 as a function of α = P/N for different
values of ǫ. Simulations performed with αN2 = 16000, with
averages over 100 disorder samples per point. A given sample
corresponds to a particular realization of the strategies aig .
with ǫ ≥ 0. For ǫ = 0 one has a pure >-Game. Upon
increasing ǫ, the non-linear, <-term gains importance,
and for ǫ→∞ one obtains a <-game with F (A) ∝ −A3.
We want to characterize the steady state of (1) in the
limit N →∞, as a function of the relative number of in-
formation patterns α = P/N < ∞. In our experiments,
we set pig(0) = 0 for all i and g, and S = 2, and focused
for a start on the observables σ2 =
〈
A2
〉
andH = 〈A|µ〉2,
where 〈· · ·〉 and 〈· · · |µ〉 denote time averages in the sta-
tionary state, the latter conditioned on the occurrence of
the information pattern µ, and the over-line stands for an
average over µ’s (· · · = (1/P )∑Pµ=1 · · · ). Averages over
the distribution of the quenched disorder (the strategies)
are also performed. As discussed at length in the early
<-game literature [17], σ2 measures the magnitude of
market fluctuations (the ‘volatility’), while H quantifies
the ‘predictability’ of the game, i.e. the presence of ex-
ploitable information: when H = 0, the winning action
cannot be predicted on the basis of µ. Notice that σ2 = 1
when agents buy and sell at random.
Results for these quantities are reported in Fig. 1 and
2. For small ǫ, one recovers as expected a pure >-game,
with σ2 = H > 1 for all α. As ǫ increases, the volatility
displays a smooth change to a <-regime, with the onset
of a cooperative phase where σ2 is better-than-random.
When ǫ → ∞, a minimum is formed close to the phase
transition αc ≃ 0.34 of the standard <-game [9]. The
predictability H shows a more articulated behavior. As
ǫ increases, H becomes smaller than 1 at low α (as in
a <-game), but it still tends to 1 for large α (as in a
>-game). Unfortunately, the low-α behavior is hard to
characterize numerically as a function of ǫ since reliable
experiments at α ≤ 0.01 require unrealistic CPU times.
For high-α, one can instead identify a sharp transition:
lim
α→∞
H =
{
1 for ǫ < ǫc ≃ 0.37
1/2 for ǫ > ǫc
(3)
A further increase of ǫ causes a reduction of exploitable
information. However, no unpredictable regime with
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FIG. 2: Predictability H as a function of α = P/N for dif-
ferent values of ǫ (top) and the reverse (bottom). Simulation
parameters are as in Fig. 1.
H = 0 is detected at low α when ǫ → ∞, at odds with
the standard <-game.
Another significant macroscopic observable is the frac-
tion φ of “frozen” agents, that is, of players for which the
difference pi1(t)− pi2(t) between the strategy valuations
diverges in the limit t → ∞, so that they end up using
only one of their strategies. The behavior of φ is shown in
Fig. 3. Again, for large α a sharp threshold separating a
>-like regime with all agents frozen (ǫ < ǫc) from a <-like
regime where φ = 0 (ǫ > ǫc) is found. For large ǫ, φ has
<-game’s characteristic shark-fin shape. Notice that as
ǫ increases φ decreases, signaling that it becomes harder
and harder for traders to identify an optimal strategy
when the market is dominated by speculators. In the
low-α, large-ǫ phase, our agents are significantly more
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FIG. 3: Fraction of frozen agents φ as a function of α =
P/N for different values of ǫ (top) and the reverse (bottom).
Simulation parameters are as in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 4: Normalized correlation function D as a function of
α = P/N for different values of ǫ. Simulation parameters are
as in Fig. 1.
likely to be frozen than in a pure <-game. This feature,
together with the absence of an unpredictable phase in
the same conditions, is due to the non-standard nature
of the <-regime in our model [18].
The fact that <-like and >-like features can coexist
at intermediate ǫ can be seen clearly by studying the
correlation [12, 15]
D =
〈A(t)A(t + 1)〉
〈A(t)2〉 =
〈A(t)A(t+ 1)〉
σ2
(4)
(see Fig. 4). For small ǫ, D is positive, signaling that
the market dynamics is completely dominated by posi-
tive correlations (i.e. by trend-followers). As ǫ increases,
anti-correlations appear at low α. The contrarian phase
becomes larger and larger as ǫ grows further and for ǫ≫ 1
the market is dominated by contrarians.
We can shed some light on the crossover from the <-
to the >-regime at large α for S = 2 drawing inspiration
from [19]. Let us define, for each agent, the strategy val-
uation difference yi(t) =
1
2 [pi1(t)− pi2(t)], and note that
the Ising spin si(t) ≡ sign[yi(t)] determines the strategy
that agent i chooses at time t. It is simple to show that
vi ≡ 〈yi(t+ 1)− yi(t)〉 = ξµi 〈F (A)|µ〉 (5)
where ξµi =
1
2 (a
µ
i1 − aµi2). If vi 6= 0, then yi(t) ∼ vit
and si(t) tends asymptotically to sign(vi): there is a
well defined preference towards one of the two strate-
gies and the agent becomes frozen. This is what happens
for ǫ ≪ 1, i.e. in the >-game regime. Here, A(t) is
a function of µ(t) only (because all agents are frozen),
therefore
〈
A2|µ〉 = 〈A|µ〉2 and σ2 = H . For large α,
when the agents’ strategic choices are roughly uncorre-
lated [20], we can approximate A(t) with a Gaussian rv
with variance H . By virtue of Wick’s theorem, this im-
plies that
〈
A3|µ〉 ≃ 3H 〈A|µ〉, so
vi ≃ (1− 3ǫH)ξµi 〈A|µ〉 (6)
If 1 − 3ǫH > 0, the agents’ spins will freeze on the >-
game solution si = sign(ξ
µ
i 〈A|µ〉), which is unstable for
1 − 3ǫH ≤ 0. Given that H = 1 for large α, we see that
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FIG. 5: Probability distributions P (A) of A > 0 for different
values of ǫ for α = 0.05 (top) and α = 2 (bottom). Simulation
parameters are as in Fig. 1.
the crossover from the >- to the <-regime takes place at
ǫ ≃ 1/3 for α ≫ 1. This estimate is significantly close
to the numerical value of ǫc ≃ 0.37. A similar argument
can be run from the <-game side, where, at large α, A(t)
can be approximated with a Gaussian random variable
with variance σ2 (in this case different from H), so that〈
A3|µ〉 ≃ 3σ2 〈A|µ〉. Arguing as before, one finds that
the stability condition of a <-game like solution is 1 −
3ǫσ2 < 0. Given that σ2 = 1 for large α, we find that
the solution is <-game like for ǫ > 1/3 when α≫ 1.
Unfortunately, the above argument is not valid at small
α since A(t) acquires strong non-Gaussian statistics, so
the quality of the approximation gets worse and worse as
α decreases. To see this, let us inspect the probability
distribution P (A) of A(t) > 0 as a function of ǫ in the
regimes of large and small α (see Fig. 5). For α = 2
and A not too large, one finds roughly that logP (A) ∝
A2−bA4 (b =constant) with a weak dependence on ǫ. For
α = 0.05, instead, P (A) is considerably more sensitive to
the the value of ǫ and cannot be fitted by a simple form as
before. In this regime, where the contribution of frozen
agents is small, we expect the system to self-organize
around a value of A such that F (A) = 0: indeed one can
see from Fig. 5 that the peak of the distribution moves as
1/
√
ǫ. Besides, as ǫ increases, large excess demands occur
with a finite probability. The emergence of such ‘tails’
in P (A), while not power-law, is a clear non-Gaussian
signature.
In the light of these findings, it is interesting to inspect
the typical market dynamics in the non-Gaussian regime.
In Fig. 6 a single realization of the game at α = 0.05
and ǫ = 1 is displayed. In particular, we show the time
series of excess returns and the time series of the price
R(t) =
∑
t′≤tA(t
′) in the steady state. One can clearly
see that while the market is mostly chaotic and domi-
nated by contrarians, ‘ordered’ periods can arise where
the excess demand is small and trends are formed, signal-
ing that chartists have taken over the market. A detailed
analysis clarifies that the spikes in A(t) occur in coordi-
4FIG. 6: Single realization of market dynamics at α = 0.05
and ǫ = 1. Top: A(t) vs t. Bottom: R(t) vs t.
nation with the transmission of a particular information
pattern ν to which the market responds by generating
large excess demands. This phenomenon is reminiscent
of the retrieval of stored patterns in neural networks, and
was also found in >-games [21], although in the present
case A(t) is not of order
√
N . However, the ‘recalled’
pattern ν changes with time, and each pattern can be
‘active’ for many time steps in a row and then quiesce
for just as long during a single run. These features make
the dynamics strongly sample-dependent, in a way that
is reminiscent of another recently studied variation of the
<-game [22].
In summary, we have introduced a class of minority
games in which the market determines whether, at each
time step, contrarians or trend followers profit, showing
that market-like phenomenology emerges when the com-
petition between the two groups is stronger. This work
raises many further questions, concerning the presence of
phase transitions, the change induced by using real mar-
ket histories instead of random information and, in par-
ticular, the extension of this model to grand-canonical
settings (the latter appears to be especially promising
as some empirical facts such as volatility clustering can
emerge only in games where the number of traders fluc-
tuates in time [11, 23, 24]). Work along these lines is
currently in progress.
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